REFINEDMONEY

THE ART OF
LIVING WELL

Six tankers, no money down

The shipyards at Gothenburg were nearly empty in 1938. Sweden had built its postwar reputation on naval engineering of considerable refinement, and by the late thirties the order books had thinned to the point where directors were courteous to anyone who walked through the door with capital. Aristotle Onassis arrived that autumn carrying a proposal so unusual that the senior management initially struggled to interpret it. He wanted six oil tankers. He wanted them built immediately. And he wanted to pay for them through an arrangement that, as far as anyone in the room could determine, had never been formally executed in international shipping before.

Figure in spotlight

Aristotle Onassis

He was thirty-two years old, born in Smyrna, displaced by the catastrophic events of 1922, and possessed of a financial reputation that lay somewhere between promising and unverifiable. The Swedes were polite. They were also, given the state of their order books, willing to listen for considerably longer than they would have under healthier market conditions. Onassis explained his proposition with the patient confidence of a man who had spent months refining each clause before walking through the door.

His proposal worked roughly as follows. He would commission the tankers. The yards would build them. Upon completion, the vessels would be chartered immediately to a major oil company, almost certainly one of the Anglo-American majors, on long-term contracts of five to ten years. Those charter contracts, signed before the steel was even cut, would then be presented to American banks as collateral against loans that would cover the actual construction costs. The oil company's signature, in effect, would finance the ship that carried its oil. Onassis would put up almost nothing of his own and emerge owning the vessels outright once the charter income had repaid the borrowing.

The arrangement is now standard practice across global shipping and has been for seventy years. In 1938, it was so close to alchemy that several senior executives reportedly required the explanation twice. The structure required three parties to agree to terms none of them had previously contemplated, and Onassis spent the better part of two years walking each of them through the same calculation until each became persuaded that the risks were already absorbed elsewhere in the chain. By the time war broke out, the foundations of his fortune were already poured.

The genius of what Onassis did at Gothenburg lay almost entirely in his understanding of where leverage actually lives. Most ambitious operators of his era were focused on the external elements of capital accumulation, ownership of assets, control of routes, accumulation of physical inventory. Onassis grasped that the truly valuable position in any transaction is the one that converts other people's certainty into your own ownership. The oil company wanted reliable shipping at a predictable cost. The bank wanted reliable repayment. The shipyard wanted reliable orders. Each of these reliabilities, once stitched together, produced an asset that belonged to whoever had organised the stitching.

The pattern would repeat through the rest of his career. He bought distressed whaling fleets when nobody else wanted them. He acquired ageing tankers at scrap valuations and ran them at full capacity through the Suez Crisis when shipping rates briefly multiplied tenfold. He understood, in a way few of his peers ever managed to articulate, that fortunes are built less by predicting the future and more by structuring positions that benefit regardless of which version of the future arrives.

Onassis had, by his late forties, become the richest man in nearly any room he entered, and the negotiations he conducted during the rest of his life followed the architecture he had assembled in those Swedish shipyards.

The wider lesson of Gothenburg has remained relevant well beyond shipping. The financial structures that look revolutionary in their first decade tend, within a generation, to become invisible furniture in the industry that adopted them. Onassis built his fortune by being the person who arrived early to a way of thinking that the market would eventually require everyone to adopt. He paid almost nothing for vessels that other operators were buying with their own capital. He carried risk that, on closer inspection, had already been transferred to parties more capable of absorbing it. He arranged terms that read like generosity to each individual signatory and resolved, in aggregate, to ownership of an industry.

Some operators succeed by working harder within existing rules. Onassis belonged to the operators who redraw the rules without announcing it, and the contract he signed at Gothenburg was the first formal articulation of how he intended to spend the next forty years.

I have always found Onassis a more interesting figure than the tabloid coverage of his later life would suggest. The yacht, the marriage, the public theatrics tend to obscure what he had actually constructed by his early thirties. The shipyard at Gothenburg is the more useful image. A young man explaining a structure that nobody in the room fully understood, and walking out with terms that would compound for the rest of his life.

Until Sunday.

MICHAŁ
REFINEDMONEY

THE ART OF
LIVING WELL